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on each individual country separately, and by accounting for dependence across countries. Our 
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effects of fiscal consolidation on employment produce mixed results, varying with country to 
country. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiscal consolidation has received new attention especially so in the aftermath of the substantial 
rise in government budget deficits and debt ratios of many countries, which resulted from the 
Great Financial Crisis of 2007/09.1 The term typically called for in many economies, regardless of 
advanced and emerging ones, to reduce high public debt ratios and rebuild fiscal buffers used 
during the crisis.2 Increases in government budget deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios for many 
countries have resulted partly from sharp rises in government spending and transfers, and partly 
from poor tax receipts during the crisis.  
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1 The consensus among the major countries of the Group of 20 (G-20) in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, and the 
subsequent Great Recession, that propelled them to announce co-ordinated stimulus packages quickly disappeared with the first 
signs of a tepid recovery. Following the 2010 Toronto Summit of the G20 leaders, many countries, especially in Europe, 
committed to fiscal consolidation in response to these concerns in the form of time-bound and targeted reductions in the 
structural budget deficit (Chowdhury and Islam, 2012). 
2 See IMF (2014).  
 Sharp increases in government spending are worrisome due to the fact that increases in 
government spending are followed by increases in taxes. Higher distortionary taxes may then 
dampen economic growth and employment in the long run (Cogan et al., 2013). With the outburst 
of the crisis, many countries have experienced large reductions in their growth rates. As a result of 
this, a low rate of economic growth caused higher unemployment. Especially in the case of the 
PIIGGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, and Spain); these countries have 
experienced a worrying decrease in growth along with rising unemployment. 
 
As the deficits and the increase in debt persisted for a long time, the problem was structural rather 
than cyclical. Because this trend was unsustainable, many countries attempted to reduce their 
budget deficits by means of fiscal contractions. Consequently, the PIIGGS countries have 
embarked on a process of implementing fiscal consolidation to provide and maintain fiscal 
sustainability, with the hope of promoting growth and employment. In this regard, deepening 
the understanding of the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidation is an important 
issue to analyze comprehensively.  
 
The objective of this contribution is to make a contribution to the current fiscal consolidation 
literature from a different perspective. To this end, the paper seeks to analyze whether fiscal 
consolidation creates the Keynesian, non-Keynesian or weak Keynesian effect by employing a 
relatively new econometric technique, at least in the context of fiscal consolidation literature; this 
is Kónya’s (2006) Bootstrap Granger causality analysis. More specifically, the paper attempts to 
provide an answer to the question of whether fiscal consolidation promotes growth and 
employment in the context of the PIIGGS countries. The reason for why we consider employment 
as a second key variable, alongside growth in our analysis, is that without regard to developed or 
developing countries, unemployment is a major socio-economic problem for all countries, which 
they may always face. Despite varying with country to country, growth may not always assure 
employment. To put it in a different way, increases in the employment capacity of an economy 
may not always be accompanied with increases in its growth rates. In other words, growth may 
not generate employment for jobless people, what is called ‘growth without employment’. Such 
type of growth is not the desired one especially for those countries, which face a growing 
unemployment rate. In short, the expectation from a fiscal consolidation, at least theoretically, is 
that it should promote both growth and employment, and we, therefore, propose to consider in our 
analysis not only growth but also employment.           
 
We believe this paper makes important contributions to the existing fiscal consolidation literature, 
as follows. We first unearth the possible existence of one-way and/or two-way causalities between 
fiscal consolidation and economic growth or between fiscal consolidation and employment within 
the context of a recently-used bootstrap causality technique, as alluded to above. Additionally, due 
to the existence of the multi-dimensional definition of fiscal consolidation, the two different 
definitions are utilized to capture these various aspects of fiscal consolidation in this paper. In so 
doing, we utilize the fiscal consolidation first proposed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998), which is 
based on the change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance and also the IMF’s 
(Devries et al., 2011), the so-called ‘policy action-based’ approach. Our contribution to the 
literature is by means of the cross-checking of two alternative methods of fiscal consolidation so 
as to confirm the robustness of the overall analysis. Finally, the paper considers the PIIGGS 
economies as the case study. As it is known, they have undertaken comprehensive fiscal 
stabilization programs soon after the Great Financial Crisis of 2007/2009, which affected these 
countries. They have hitherto encountered huge budget deficits and government debt burdens due 
to generous fiscal stimulus packages that were put into practice to rescue bankrupt companies as 
well as to provide the life-line support to their economies, in order to help those countries to 
overcome the great recession.  However, after 2010, they abandoned expansionary fiscal policies. 
Instead, they proceeded to implement contractionary fiscal policies, i.e. fiscal consolidation.       
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical debates that relate 
to fiscal consolidation. Section 3 presents the related empirical literature, while Section 4 
describes methodology and data. Section 5 describes empirical results and then discusses some 
economic and policy implications. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2 THEORETICAL DEBATES RELATED TO FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
 
The debate on fiscal consolidation stems from the conventional Keynesian wisdom that argues 
that fiscal austerity3 has a contractionary effect on economic activity.4 According to this 
proposition, cuts in government spending and tax hikes that imply contractionary fiscal policy, 
adversely affect aggregate demand and therefore output through the fiscal multiplier mechanism. 
More clearly, the conventional Keynesian view asserts that fiscal consolidation, at least in the 
short run, triggers an adverse effect on aggregate demand and thus on growth and employment 
through either government spending cuts and/or tax hikes, or both. The multiplier effects of fiscal 
consolidation aggravate the initial demand drag on the economy (Kolev and Matthes, 2013). 
 
Contractionary fiscal policy can either be caused directly by a reduction in public consumption or 
investment or indirectly by the fall in private consumption –brought about by higher taxes or 
lower transfers to households. In line with this, the so-called accelerator mechanism suggests that 
changes in investment, as a response to a fall in output, amplify the effect of any change in private 
consumption or government spending on aggregate demand (Escudero and Mourelo, 2017). 
However, in the early 1990s, the standard Keynesian proposition was challenged by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990), who asserted that fiscal consolidation could create an expansionary effect on both 
growth and employment not only in the long run but also in the short run.5 They demonstrated in 
their study that by considering the case of Ireland in 1987–89 and in Denmark in 1983–86 in 
terms of how the large consolidations were associated with large consumption and investment 
booms in these economies. With a sharp contrast to the traditional wisdom, their findings 
indicated that during the years of fiscal consolidation, the growth rate increased and 
unemployment decreased in these two countries.6 This expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation 
based on Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) is termed as ‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ in the 
literature.7,8  
                                                          
3 The terms ‘fiscal austerity’, ‘fiscal consolidation’, ’fiscal contraction’ and ‘fiscal adjustment’ are used interchangeably through 
this paper. 
4 Obviously, fiscal consolidation carries a negative direct demand effect in the short run. However, the question of how strong 
the net short-run effect on growth is, and perhaps even its sign, is uncertain (Baxter and King, 1993). 
5 As far as we know, the ‘expansionary fiscal contractions hypothesis’ was firstly proposed by Feldstein (1982) and then repeated 
by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and his followers.   
6 Apart from Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), there is a vast literature arguing for the possibility that fiscal consolidation is not 
harmful, and might indeed result in a boost to economic growth in the short-run. Follow-up studies, such as Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010), Giavazzi et al. (2000), Ardagna (2004), 
Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) appear to be in a consensus that fiscal consolidation is not always self-defeating. 
Additionally, several theoretical justifications of its non-Keynesian effects have been offered in the literature (see, for 
instance, Coenen et al., 2008; Almeida et al., 2011). 
7 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Perotti (1998). 
8 According to the expansionary fiscal contraction view, benign effects of fiscal consolidation rely on the perceived 
persistence of public spending cuts. If government spending is expected to be permanently lower, then permanent income 
rises and the thereby induced rise in private consumption may outweigh the depressing effects of elementary Keynesian 
multiplier mechanics. If, however, government spending cuts are not long-run credible, then the latter effects dominate and 
hence Keynesian results emerge. For further details, see Lucke (1999). 
Unlike the conventional Keynesian view, the Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1990) expansionary fiscal 
contractions hypothesis relies on a more optimistic viewpoint regarding fiscal consolidation. 
According to proponents of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation, the negative aggregate 
demand effects emanating from fiscal consolidation can be compensated by the non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal consolidation that emerge from various channels. First of all, fiscal consolidation 
efforts mean reductions in government deficits and government’s debt burden. It is highly likely 
that reductions in the both improve expectations with regard to debt sustainability as well as 
enhance government credibility with regard to its ability and willingness to reduce fiscal deficits 
and debts further, compelling real interest rates to fall. Secondly, falling interest rates can create 
crowding-in effects on private investment as well as wealth effects on consumption9, which could 
outweigh negative Keynesian demand effects. Thirdly, fiscal consolidation efforts not only do 
they improve the general confidence of economic actors but also increase their propensity to 
spend or invest more.10 
 
The theoretical arguments of this challenging view of the Keynesian position on this matter are 
based on the standard neo-classical view. Neo-classical proponents of fiscal consolidation are 
grounded on their arguments and concerns about the effectiveness of fiscal policy  and the need 
to focus on debt/deficit management can also be rationalized in terms of three propositions: the 
‘Ricardian equivalence theorem’, the ‘crowding out’ and ‘market confidence’. The ‘Ricardian 
equivalence theorem’ maintains that public sector profligacy may be fully offset by private sector 
prudence since economic agents correctly anticipate that future tax liabilities will rise as a result of 
fiscal expansion. It then follows that the contractionary consequences of a fiscal retrenchment will 
be balanced by an increase in private sector spending as ‘fully rational’ economic agents correctly 
anticipate a decline in future tax liabilities. The crowding out thesis maintains that fiscal 
expansions lead to a rise in real interest rates thus inducing a decline in private sector spending 
because of its sensitivity to higher costs of borrowing. The strong version of this thesis suggests 
that the decline in private sector spending will exceed the increase in aggregate demand, induced 
by the increase in government expenditure. It follows that, under such circumstances, fiscal 
austerity can boost growth by stimulating private sector spending. Finally, the least theoretically 
grounded, but the most influential view is that fiscal austerity now is necessary because it will 
provide market confidence that lies at the core of private sector spending decisions. One should 
also note that the advocates of the market confidence thesis overlook the fact that rating agencies 
typically include growth variables in their assessment of sovereign risk analysis. More 
importantly, studies have shown that the impact of a growth contraction on measures of sovereign 
risks is higher than the impact of debts and deficits on such risks. Hence, when fiscal 
consolidation leads to growth contractions they reduce rather than raise market confidence 
(Verick and Islam, 2010; Chowdhury and Islam, 2012).  
 
Fiscal consolidation measures are worthwhile if they have growth and employment promoting 
effects or, at the very least, they do not lead to a net decline in aggregate demand. There are thus 
various channels through which a fiscal consolidation program can either reach its goal without 
imposing any output or employment loss or, even better, be accompanied by growth and 
employment creation. These propositions, despite the theoretical problems with them (see, for 
example, Arestis and Sawyer, 1998; Arestis, 2011, 2012), ultimately need to be also empirically 
investigated. Here, the evidence does not support the propositions of the advocates of fiscal 
                                                          
9 Wealth effect on consumption explains the effects of reduction of tax burdens of individuals on their consumption resulted 
from fiscal consolidation. Accordingly, reduction in tax burden of individuals means an increase in incomes of them. 
Increases in income led by reduction in taxes stimulate private consumption by depending on marginal propensity to 
consume.       
10 For further explanations, see Alesina et al., 1998; Bhattacharya and Mukherjee, 2013; Kolev and Matthes, 2013. 
consolidation. There is hardly any evidence that fiscal policy multipliers are either zero as in the 
case of full Ricardian equivalence or negative as in the strong version of the crowding out 
thesis. Even some of the proponents of fiscal consolidation agree that the available evidence 
suggests that fiscal policy has significant effects on output and employment and those effects are 
likely to be larger during recessions (Islam and Chowdhury, 2010). 
 
3 REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
The empirical testing of the effects of fiscal consolidation on macroeconomic variables has 
received great concern throughout last decade. This concern has shown itself recently in a number 
of studies for many specific country or country groups.  Following-up the studies by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990), several studies such as Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997), Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996), and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) have addressed the issue.  
 
In reviewing the existing literature, we observe that there are a substantially large but still growing 
number of empirical studies on fiscal consolidation. Considering the current literature, the existing 
studies can be classified under three main tendencies. In this regard, several studies, including 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Alesina et al. (2002), Barro and 
Redlick (2009), Hall (2009), Ramey (2009), and Romer and Romer (2010), take fiscal 
consolidation into account as part of a broader literature on the effects of fiscal policy and/or 
expansionary effects of fiscal policy; whereas some others, such as Heylen and Everaert (2000), 
Giudice et al. (2004), and Afonso et al. (2006), examine the conditions for successful fiscal 
consolidations with an idea that they bring about a significant reduction in the debt burden of 
countries. Another stream of the literature attempts is to find out what the most effective fiscal 
policy instruments are for successful fiscal consolidation.  
 
Large parts of the studies mentioned above, tend to confirm that expenditure cut-based adjustment 
programmes are more effective than that of tax hike-based ones in both boosting confidence and 
output (see Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, 1998; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; McDermott and 
Wescott, 1996; Perotti, 1998; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Afonso  et al., 2006; Giudice et al., 
2007; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010, 2013; Afonso and Jalles, 2012; Hernández de Cos and Moral-
Benito, 2013, among others). However, it is worth mentioning that there are few studies, such as 
Briotti (2002), Baldacci et al. (2004), and Mati and Thornton (2008), which reveal opposite 
results.  
 
The study by Alesina and Perotti (1996) is interesting in that it suggests that expenditure-based 
fiscal consolidation has been more successful than revenue-based one, so far as debt reduction is 
concerned – fiscal adjustments through spending cuts on transfers and government wage bill to 
that by tax increases. Dermott and Wescott (1996) focused on 74 cases of fiscal consolidation in 
20 industrialized countries over the period 1970-1995. They find that 14 country cases were 
successful in the sense that they were marked by a sustainable reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
as well as an increase in growth and employment creation. In this regard, Gupta et al. (2005) draw 
attention to the size of the fiscal adjustment, which is crucial for fiscal sustainability in particular 
for countries with high initial fiscal deficits. Based on their empirical findings, they go further in 
that expenditure-based adjustments lead to lasting fiscal consolidations, while revenue-based 
programs are short-lived. A follow-up study by Alesina and Ardagna (2009) explored 107 
episodes of fiscal consolidation in the OECD countries during the period 1970-2007. They found 
that out of 107 episodes, 27 episodes could be classified as cases that combined fiscal 
consolidation with growth. Along similar lines, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) analyzed fiscal 
consolidation episodes in the OECD countries for the period 1970-2007. They concluded that 21 
OECD countries could be classified as cases that combined fiscal consolidation with growth. 
 
Afonso and Jalles (2012) re-visited the so-called expansionary fiscal adjustment using alternative 
measures of fiscal episodes. According to their results, the change in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance contributed positively to the success of a fiscal consolidation. The share of the 
consolidation that took place via the spending side of the budget had almost always a positive 
estimated coefficient but it was never statistically significant. On the other hand, if a fiscal 
consolidation was based largely on the revenue side, it reduced the corresponding probability of 
success.  
 
Moreover, the study by Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) found that in order to 
succeed in reducing debt levels, economic growth was the factor. On the other hand, cuts in public 
wages were the key ingredient of fiscal consolidations in which persistent reductions in primary 
budget deficits were achieved. Arin et al. (2015) start with dataset used by Arin et al. (2011) and 
re-estimate the determinants of successful fiscal consolidations, using semi-parametric methods. 
Their results show that the more governments rely on cutting expenditures, the more likely that 
they succeed in their consolidation attempts.  
 
Nevertheless, so far, there is no general consensus in the literature on the relationship between 
fiscal consolidation, economic growth, and employment. As for the fiscal consolidation, growth 
and employment relations, the existing literature on this matter is indeed scarce. On the one hand, 
the fiscal consolidation literature contains some empirical studies linking fiscal consolidation with 
growth and/or employment but they are very few (see, for instance, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; 
Giordano et al., 2007; Cimadomo and Bénassy-Quéré, 2012). The empirical findings of these 
studies reveal that positive shocks on government spending stimulate output at least in the short 
run. With regard to taxes, they found that positive shocks on taxes suppress output (see especially, 
Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Cimadomo and Bénassy-Quéré, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, most empirical studies on the impact of fiscal consolidation focus on output, 
and only just few of these studies look at the employment case (see Monacelli et al., 2010; 
Brückner and Pappa, 2012; Turrini, 2013; Banerjee and Zampolli, 2016; and, Escudero and 
Mourelo, 2017). One can reach this firm judgment shortly after a quick review of the current 
empirical works on the issue. For example, Monacelli et al. (2010) estimate a negative but 
significant impact of government spending on unemployment and job creation. Brückner and 
Pappa (2012) estimate structural VARs for a number of OECD countries and show that 
government spending can actually raise employment and unemployment at the same time, due to 
the fact that it also increases participation. A recent study by Turrini (2013) estimates the impact 
of fiscal consolidation on unemployment across EU countries, using a recent database of 
consolidation episodes built on the basis of a ‘narrative’ approach of Devries et al. (2011). The 
empirical results produced by Turrini (2013) show that the effect of fiscal consolidation on 
cyclical unemployment is significant but temporary for government spending-based measures. 
Escudero and Mourelo (2017) contribute to the existing literature by assessing quantitatively the 
short-term impact on job creation of changes in the expenditure and revenue composition during 
the Great Recession to shed light on how to boost employment while preserving fiscal positions. 
The analysis is undertaken by ways of a pooled cross-country and time-series model based on 32 
advanced countries during the crisis period of 2007-2011. The results show that a fiscally-neutral 
change in the expenditure and revenue composition of fiscal consolidation can boost job creation. 
 
Despite a vast number of studies attempting to test the effects of fiscal consolidation, the empirical 
findings have produced no clear-cut results. Hence, further empirical studies focusing on different 
country-economies with different econometric techniques, as in the case of this study, may help in 
better understanding the nature and underlying mechanisms of the fiscal consolidation issue in 
general and its effect on growth and employment in particular. 
 
4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
4.1 Methodology  
 
In this paper, we employ the Bootstrap Granger Causality approach, proposed by Kónya (2006). 
The Kónya’s (op. cit.) approach has three superiorities over the alternative panel causality 
approaches.11 First of all, this approach is based on a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) 
estimation that allows us to take into account cross-sectional dependence across countries. 
Second, it does not require the joint hypothesis for all members of the panel because it is based on 
a Wald test with country-specific bootstrap critical values. Finally, it requires no pre-testing for 
panel unit roots or co-integrating relationships. Since country-specific bootstrap critical values are 
used in this approach, the model variables need not be stationary. The variables can be used in 
level form, regardless of their unit root and cointegration properties.  
 
4.1.1 Cross-sectional dependence and slope homogeneity 
 
Investigating Granger causality within panel data framework requires a careful treatment. The 
first issue in that respect is to control for a possible cross-sectional dependency across countries 
since a shock affecting one country may also affect other countries because of a high degree of 
globalization as well as of international trade and financial integration. The Monte Carlo 
experiment carried out by Pesaran (2006) emphasizes the importance of testing for the cross-
sectional dependence in a panel data study and also illustrates the substantial bias and size 
distortions when cross-sectional dependence is ignored. The second issue is to decide whether the 
slope coefficients are treated as homogenous and heterogeneous to impose the causality restriction 
on the estimated parameters. The causality from one variable to another variable by imposing the 
joint restriction for the panel is the strong null hypothesis (Granger, 2003); and the homogeneity 
assumption for the parameters is not able to capture heterogeneity due to country-specific 
characteristics (Breitung, 2005).12 
 
4.1.2 Panel causality test  
 
If there are cross-sectional dependency and heterogeneity across countries, the method utilized 
should account for these features. Kónya (2006) showed that this approach did not require any 
pre-testing for the panel unit root and cointegration. In addition, by imposing country-specific 
constraints, we could also identify which and how many countries have Granger causal relations 
between their fiscal consolidation episodes, economic growth, and employment.  
 
The system to be estimated in the bootstrap panel causality approach can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
11 We refer the interested readers to Kónya (2006) for a comprehensive discussion regarding panel causality methods. 
12 See Appendix B for a detailed description of the cross-sectional dependence and slope homogeneity tests. 
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 𝛿2,𝑁,𝑖𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑁,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀2,𝑁,𝑡                                                            (4) 
 
 
where [𝐹𝐶1,𝑡 , 𝐹𝐶2,𝑡 , … , 𝐹𝐶𝑁,𝑡]
′
, [𝐸𝐺1,𝑡 , 𝐸𝐺2,𝑡 , … , 𝐸𝐺𝑁,𝑡]
′
 and [𝐸𝑀𝑃1,𝑡 ,
𝐸𝑀𝑃2,𝑡 , … , 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑁,𝑡]
′
 denote the fiscal consolidation episodes (i.e. FC(AA), FC(IMF)), economic 
growth (EG) variable (i.e. real GDP), and employment rate (EMP), respectively. l is the lag 
length, 𝑖𝐹𝐶1 and 𝑖𝐸𝐺1 are the maximal lags for FC and EG in the first set of equations, and 𝑖𝐹𝐶2 
and 𝑖𝐸𝐺2 are the maximal lags for FC and EG in the second set of equations, and N is the number 
of the members in a panel (j = 1, 2, …, N). Since each equation in this system has different 
predetermined variables, while the error terms might be contemporaneously correlated (i.e. cross-
sectional dependency), these sets of equations are the SUR system. In the bootstrap panel 
causality approach, there are alternative causal relations to be found for a country: (i) there is one-
way Granger causality from EG to FC if not all 𝛿1𝑗,𝑖𝑠 are zero, but all 𝛽2,𝑗,𝑖𝑠 are zero; (ii) there is a 
one-way Granger causality running from FC to EG if all 𝛿1𝑗,𝑖𝑠 are zero, but not all 𝛽2,𝑗,𝑖𝑠 are zero; 
(iii) there is a two-way Granger causality between EG and FC if neither 𝛿1𝑗,𝑖𝑠 nor 𝛽2,𝑗,𝑖𝑠  are zero; 
and finally (iv) there is no Granger causality between EG and FC if all 𝛿1𝑗,𝑖𝑠 and 𝛽2,𝑗,𝑖𝑠  are zero. 
The same causal relations can be established in terms of FC and EMP.  
 
4.2 Data 
 
In this paper, we use annual data. The data come from the following three sources: AMECO 
European Commission database, IMF’s e-library as well as its WEO database. The study period 
of the paper spans from 1980 to 2014. The main reason for commencing data set from 1980 
onwards is the availability of harmonized data for the countries under consideration.  
 
We use three variables: fiscal consolidation episodes, GDP growth rate, and employment rate. 
One of the most important issues in examining the relationship between fiscal consolidation, 
economic growth, and employment is how to obtain a satisfactory empirical measure of fiscal 
episodes either fiscal adjustments or expansions. This difficulty comes from the variety of 
definitions of fiscal consolidation episodes used in the literature.13 Still, how to determine a 
successful fiscal consolidation episode remains a non-consensual matter.  
 
Despite that other criteria have been employed in the literature,14 we use two alternative 
definitions of successful fiscal consolidation:   
 
(i) using the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (hereafter denoted by 
CAPB) is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in 1 year or at least 1.5 percentage points on 
average in the last 2 years (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 1998); and  
(ii) using the so-called policy action-based approach to account for consolidation episodes 
(e.g. Devries et al., 2011). 
 
The percentage change in the CAPB-to-GDP ratio developed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) is a 
widely used measurement method for fiscal consolidation episodes in the literature.  This method 
is also the most commonly used approach in diagnosing fiscal episodes, which allow us to make 
the correction of the effects resulting from economic activity such as inflation or real interest rate 
changes. The CAPB measures adjust the budget data for changes in the macroeconomic 
environment and/or for the non-discretionary interest payments. Arguably, the cyclical adjustment 
is desirable as it makes it possible to filter out the discretionary effects of fiscal policy. However, 
the methods of calculation vary so greatly that it is doubtful whether cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance (hereafter denoted by CAB) ratios are in fact suitable indicators for determining 
consolidation periods. Moreover, the data differs to a large extent depending on whether one uses 
IMF, EU or OECD data. Therefore, the reliability of the cyclically adjusted budget balance and 
CAPB data can be questioned (Wagschal and Wenzelburger, 2012).15 
 
In addition to CAPB and CAB approaches that are widely used in the current literature, we also 
consider the policy action-based approach proposed by the IMF to identify fiscal episodes.16 By 
doing so, we aim to cross-check two alternative definitions of fiscal consolidation episodes so that 
we can confer robustness to the overall analysis. In other words, we estimate the IMF’s fiscal 
                                                          
13 See Wagschal and Wenzelburger (2012) for a broader review of alternative definitions of fiscal consolidation. 
14 See Alesina and Perotti (1995), McDermott and Wescott (1996), Perotti (1999), and Lambertini and Tavares (2003).  
15 The IMF criticizes the existing literature for the use of cyclically adjusted budget balance (IMF, 2010: 96): ‘The change in 
the CAPB-to-GDP ratio is an unreliable guide regarding the presence of fiscal consolidation. The standard approach tends to 
select periods associated with favorable outcomes but during which no austerity measures were actually taken. It also tends to 
omit cases of fiscal austerity with unfavorable outcomes.’  
16 For further details, see Devries et al. (2011). 
consolidation definitions (Devries et al., 2011) in addition to Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) 
definitions for the robustness checks. 
 
We label fiscal consolidation episodes as FC(AA) and FC(IMF).17 The FC(AA) measure is the 
definition used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and the FC(IMF) measure follows IMF (Devries 
et al., 2011). The IMF’s episodes are identified by looking at IMF and OECD historical reports 
and by checking what countries intended to do at the time of publication. The IMF’s policy-action 
based approach uses descriptive historical facts to describe what happened to the deficit in a 
particular period.  
 
We generate two dummy variables for all fiscal episode definitions FC(AA) and FC(IMF) 
called ‘fiscal consolidation episodes’, which take the value of one when consolidation occurs and 
a value of zero otherwise. The IMF’s fiscal consolidation dummy 18 is defined following the 
narrative approach and focusing on policy actions i.e. years in which the government 
implemented tax hikes or spending cuts to reduce the budget deficit regardless of the change in 
the CAPB.  
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used are provided in Table 1 of Appendix A. The 
figures presented in Table 1 indicate that, on average, the highest average GDP growth rate for 
the sample period is observed in Ireland as 4.30 per thousand. This country is followed by the 
other countries, Spain (2.23), Great Britain (2.15), Portugal (1.94), Italy (1.24), and Greece (0.89). 
In terms of the employment rate, Portugal has the highest average return (as 55.22 per thousand) 
among the sample countries. Portugal is tracked by Great Britain (52.29), Ireland (47.93), Greece 
(44.38), Spain (43.93), and Italy (42.82), respectively. Greece, Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain are ordered for an average return of Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal 
consolidation episode. Turning to IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode, it shows that Spain, Italy, 
Great Britain, Ireland, and Portugal are ordered for average return, respectively. At the same 
time, it is difficult to point out remarkable differences for both fiscal consolidation episodes 
across countries during the study period, 1980-2014.   
 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Before considering panel data causality, it is pretty important to investigate the characteristics of 
cross-sectional dependency and slope heterogeneity among countries under consideration. If a 
cross-sectional dependency exists among the countries, it would be more efficient to use the SUR 
approach than the Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) one when estimating panel data causality 
(Zellner, 1962). In addition, Pesaran (2006) argued that substantial biases and size distortions 
would occur when cross-sectional dependency existed and was ignored. Finally, if we assume that 
the panel data series have the property of homogeneity, then the heterogeneity among countries 
showing country-specific characteristics will not be captured (Breitung, 2005).  
 
In this contribution, therefore, we examine firstly the panel data to find out whether the 
characteristics of cross-sectional dependency and slope heterogeneity among countries exist. If 
so, then the approach proposed by Kónya (2006) is the most appropriate one in analyzing panel 
data and Granger causality between variables considered in this paper. To investigate the 
existence of cross-section dependence we carry out four different tests (LM, CDlm, CD, LMadj). 
These test results are reported in Table 1. 
 
                                                          
17 Fiscal consolidation episodes proposed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) are computed by the authors.  
18 The IMF’s dummy is not available for Greece. 
Table 1 Cross-sectional dependency and homogeneity test. 
Study FC(AA) FC(IMF) EG EMP 
LM (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) 276.812*** 214.651*** 344.780*** 305.204*** 
CD (Pesaran, 2004) 14.006*** 10.691*** 12.702*** 15.893*** 
𝐶𝐷𝑎𝑑𝑗 (Pesaran et al., 2008) 13.875*** 11.794*** 14.546*** 13.903*** 
Swamy (1970) 657.091*** 567.815*** 812.704*** 709.540*** 
∆̃ 123.809*** 146.340*** 173.365*** 187.371*** 
∆̃𝑎𝑑𝑗 2.129*** 1.401*** 3.185*** 4.609*** 
Notes: (*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance.  
The data cover the whole sample period from 1980 to 2014. FC(AA), EG, FC(IMF) and EMP denote Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal 
consolidation episode, economic growth, IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode and employment, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the null of no cross-sectional dependency across the countries is strongly 
rejected at the conventional levels of significance, implying that the SUR method is 
appropriate rather than the country-by-country OLS estimation. This finding implies that a 
shock occurred in one of the PIIGGS countries tends to be transmitted to other countries and 
that when a shock occurs in any of them, it, then, would affect the others.  
 
Table 1 also shows the results obtained from the two slope homogeneity tests, Wald and S. 
Both tests reject the null hypothesis of the slope homogeneity hypothesis, supporting the 
country specific heterogeneity. The rejection of slope homogeneity implies that the panel 
causality analysis by imposing homogeneity restriction on the variable may result in misleading 
inferences. In this respect, the panel causality analysis based on estimating a panel vector 
autoregression and/or panel vector error correction model rely on the generalized method of 
moments; and the pooled ordinary least square estimator is not a proper approach in detecting 
causal linkages between fiscal consolidationeconomic growth and employment in the 
PIIGGS countries. As highlighted earlier, it is important to implement both cross-sectional 
dependence tests and slope heterogeneity tests prior to analyzing panel data Granger causality. 
The results significantly reject the null hypothesis and indicate that not only do these fiscal 
consolidation episodes influence the variable of economic growth and employment in each 
country but also that the regression error terms for countries also influence each other. 
 
Since it is likely that the results obtained from the causality test are sensitive to the lag 
structure, determining the optimal lag length(s) has crucially important implications for the 
robustness of our findings. Thereby, prior to embarking on the econometric estimation, it is 
essential to specify the number of lags.19 For a relatively large panel, equation and variable 
with varying lag structure would lead to an increase in the computational burden substantially. 
As pointed out by Kónya (2006), the selection of the optimal lag structure is highly important, 
because the causality test results depend on this.  
 
To determine the optimal lag structure, we follow Kónya's (2006) approach in which maximum 
lags are allowed to vary across variables, but remain the same across equations. We estimate 
the system for each possible pair of 𝑙𝑦1 , 𝑙𝑥2 , 𝑙𝑦2 and 𝑙𝑥2 by assuming 1 to 4 lags and then 
choose the combinations which minimize the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion. 
 
The existence of the cross-sectional dependency and the heterogeneity across the PIIGGS 
countries support the evidence regarding the suitability of the bootstrap panel causality approach. 
In order to save space, the summary of the bootstrap panel causality analysis is presented in 
Table 2.20 
                                                          
19 See Table 2 of Appendix A for the lag selection procedure. 
20 The details of panel Granger causality tests are reported in Appendix C tables 1-4. 
Table 2 Summary of panel causality analysis. 
 
 
Direction  
of Granger causality 
 
 
PIIGGS Country 
 
 
Granger causality exists 
Yes / No Significance and the sign 
of causality 
FC(AA)EG Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, 
Spain 
No Insignificant 
EGFC(AA) Ireland, Greece, Spain Yes Significant and negative 
FC(IMF)EG Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, 
Spain 
No Insignificant 
EGFC(IMF) Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, 
Spain 
No Insignificant 
FC(AA)EMP Portugal Yes Significant and negative 
EMPFC(AA) Portugal Yes Significant and negative 
FC(IMF)EMP Italy Yes Significant and negative 
Great Britain Yes Significant and positive 
EMPFC(IMF) Portugal Yes Significant and positive 
Spain Yes Significant and negative 
Notes: FC(AA), EG, FC(IMF) and EMP denote Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal consolidation episode, economic growth, IMF’s fiscal 
consolidation episode and employment, respectively. The IMF’s dummy is not available for Greece. 
‘→’ represents Granger causal direction.  
 
Several interesting aspects need to be noted from Table 2. First, regarding the direction of 
FC(AA) and FC(IMF) to economic growth (EG), we do not find any significant relationship in 
the countries under consideration. Second, we obtain a significant as well as negative one-way      
Granger causality running from FC(AA) to employment only for Portugal. As for the direction of 
FC(IMF) to employment, we find a significant and negative relationship only for Italy. On the 
other hand, there is a significant and positive one-way Granger causality running from FC(IMF) 
to employment for Great Britain. Overall, our empirical findings provide no evidence indicating 
that fiscal consolidation positively affects economic growth for PIIGGS countries. Our 
findings also confirm that outside Italy and Portugal, in all other countries fiscal consolidation 
adversely affect employment. 
Based on all these empirical findings, we can infer that fiscal consolidation episodes in the 
PIIGGS countries do not support the validity of the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis 
proposed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), and some others (Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997; 
Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010; Giavazzi et al., 2000). Quite the contrary, our findings tend to 
support the Keynesian view that argues that fiscal consolidation reduces growth as well as 
employment. These findings may be justified as follows: contractionary fiscal policies aiming 
to provide fiscal consolidation in these countries leads to a reduction in aggregate demand. 
Reduction in aggregate demand results in weakening both growth and employment.    
 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we attempt to examine empirically the possible existence of Granger causal 
interrelationship between fiscal consolidation and growth, as well as between fiscal consolidation 
and employment, for a panel of the PIIGGS countries that were made up of the European’s most 
affected crisis-countries: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, and Spain. To do so, first 
we identify fiscal episodes by replicating Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) and the IMF’s 
approaches, and then we employ the Bootstrap Granger causality test proposed by Kónya (2006) 
on annual panel data for the period 1980-2014. 
 
Our empirical results provide no evidence, corroborating the validity of the expansionary fiscal 
contraction hypothesis that argues fiscal consolidation promotes growth and employment even in 
the short run. Conversely, the results, to a large extent, tend to support the conventional Keynesian 
view that argues that fiscal consolidation negatively affects both growth and employment in the 
short run.  
 
The results confirm that there exists no strong evidence supporting the view that fiscal 
consolidation episodes are an important determinant of economic growth and employment in the 
PIIGGS countries. This result may be justified on the basis of the development level of the sample 
countries. All the countries considered in this paper are developed countries. So, in these 
countries, different from developing ones, opportunities generating further government revenue 
through, for example, revenue mobilization or reducing public spending through efficiency 
increases, are highly limited. In such circumstances, fiscal consolidation policies in these 
countries may have resulted in a reduction of aggregate demand, leading to decreases in growth 
and employment.      
 
In conclusion, the fiscal consolidation arguably needed to improve the structural balances, 
along with reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the countries analyzed, are less likely to 
generate a favorable growth and employment environment as far as the study period 
considered in this contribution.   
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Great Britain Spain 
GDP Growth Rate 
Mean 1.942 4.308 1.243 0.894 2.154 2.235 
Median 1.898 4.354 1.559 2.000 2.527 2.674 
Maximum 7.489 10.862 4.194 5.794 5.787 5.547 
Minimum -4.028 -4.565 -5.482 -9.132 -4.327 -3.573 
Std. Dev. 2.757 3.896 1.941 3.621 2.025 2.260 
Skewness -0.154 -0.325 -1.356 -0.964 -1.155 -0.809 
Kurtosis 2.488 2.758 5.658 3.473 4.815 3.044 
Normalitya 0.519 0.704 21.041 5.748 12.597 3.828 
p-value 0.771 0.702 0.000 0.056 0.001 0.147 
Sum 67.993 150.782 43.526 31.311 75.424 78.256 
Sum Sq. Dev. 258.507 516.226 128.193 445.824 139.553 173.691 
Employment Rate 
Mean 55.220 47.931 42.825 44.382 52.294 43.934 
Median 55.900 49.800 44.200 46.400 57.500 43.600 
Maximum 59.200 61.100 45.900 49.400 59.300 53.800 
Minimum 47.700 0.000 27.900 0.000 0.000 37.000 
Std. Dev. 2.974 13.198 4.537 8.162 16.344 4.772 
Skewness -0.826 -2.708 -2.561 -4.787 -2.896 0.510 
Kurtosis 2.822 10.663 8.387 26.507 9.531 2.195 
Normalitya 4.028 128.444 80.594 939.597 111.153 2.464 
p-value 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.291 
Sum 1932.700 1677.600 1498.900 1553.400 1830.300 1537.700 
Sum Sq. Dev. 300.776 5922.515 700.106 2265.210 9083.039 774.558 
Fiscal Consolidation (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) 
Mean 0.257 0.142 0.142 0.314 0.171 0.114 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.443 0.355 0.355 0.471 0.382 0.322 
Skewness 1.111 2.041 2.041 0.800 1.743 2.424 
Kurtosis 2.235 5.166 5.166 1.640 4.040 6.879 
Normalitya 8.057 31.151 31.151 6.430 19.312 56.237 
p-value 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 
Sum 9.000 5.000 5.000 11.000 6.000 4.000 
Sum Sq. Dev. 6.685 4.285 4.285 7.542 4.971 3.542 
Fiscal Consolidation (Devries et al., 2011) 
Mean 0.200 0.228 0.314 - 0.228 0.400 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.405 0.426 0.471 - 0.426 0.497 
Skewness 1.500 1.292 0.800 - 1.292 0.408 
Kurtosis 3.250 2.671 1.640 - 2.671 1.166 
Normalitya 13.216 9.906 6.430 - 9.906 5.873 
p-value 0.001 0.007 0.040 - 0.007 0.053 
Sum 7.000 8.000 11.000 - 8.000 14.000 
Sum Sq. Dev. 5.600 6.171 7.542 - 6.171 8.400 
No of obs. 35 35 35 - 35 35 
a Jarque-Bera normality test. The p-values correspond to the Jarque-Bera normality statistic. The IMF’s dummy is not available for Greece. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 The lag selection procedure  
 
Lags FC(AA) causes EG EG causes FC(AA) FC(AA) causes EMP EMP causes FC(AA) 
AIC SBIC AIC SBIC AIC SBIC AIC          SBIC 
1 -4.740 -4.672 -5.317 -5.214 -4.725 -4.626 -5.317         -4.087 
2 -4.756* -4.810* -5.610 -5.655 -4.781 -4.285 -5.017    -5.770 
3 -4.210 -4.716 -5.947 -5.917 -4.417 -4.215 -4.142  -5.482 
4 -4.745 -4.670 -6.312* -6.318* -4.840* -4.883* -5.653*         -5.784* 
Lags FC(IMF) causes EG EG causes FC(IMF) FC(IMF) causes EMP EMP causes FC(IMF) 
1 -4.017 -4.528 -5.130 -5.180 -4.907* -4.631* -5.417         -5.282 
2 -4.144* -4.907* -5.210 -5.147 -4.716 -4.288 -5.216   -5.528 
3 -4.051 -4.347 -5.479 -4.716 -4.709 -4.540 -5.017          -5.479 
4 -4.137 -4.208 -5.804* -5.265* -4.548 -4.488 -5.485*          -5.568* 
Notes: (*) denotes optimal lag selected. FC(AA), EG, FC(IMF) and EMP denote Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal consolidation episode, 
economic growth, IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode, and employment, respectively. 
 
  
Appendix B 
 
Cross-sectional dependence and slope homogeneity tests. 
  
Cross-sectional dependency tests 
 
The cross-sectional dependency among countries implies that a shock that affects one country 
may spill on to other countries. Cross-sectional dependency is the most important issue when 
dealing with panel data Granger causality across borders. Due to globalization and increasing  
degree of  integration among countries, a shock that occurs within one nation, it also influences 
other countries, such as the recent European bond crisis, which was felt around the world. 
Therefore, when we examine the panel data causality between fiscal consolidation, growth rate 
and employment rate among the PIIGGS countries considered in this work, is necessary to carry 
out a series of cross-sectional dependence tests.  
 
To test for cross-sectional dependency, Breusch and Pagan (1980) proposed a Lagrange test. 
Breusch and Pagan's (1980) LM test has been used in many empirical studies to test cross-
sectional dependency. LM statistics can be calculated using the following panel model: 
 
yit = αi + 𝛽𝑖
′xit + μit                                                                                     (1) 
 
for  i = 1, 2, …, N; t = 1, 2, …, T         , 
 
where i is the cross section dimension, t is the time dimension; 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 
xit is kx1 vector of explanatory variables while, and αi and βi are the individual intercepts and 
slope coefficients allowed to differ across states. In the LM test, the null hypothesis of no 
cross-sectional dependence  H0 : Cov (μit, μjt) = 0 for all t and i ≠ j is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence  H1 : Cov (μit, μjt) ≠ 0 for at least one 
pair of i≠ j. Breusch and Pagan (1980) developed the following Lagrange multiplier statistic:  
 
LMBP = T
1
1
N
i
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
1
N
j i 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑗2                ,                                                                                            (2) 
 
where ρ̂ij
2 is the sample estimate of the pair-wise correlation of the residuals obtained from 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of Equation (1) for each i. Under the null hypothesis, 
the LM statistic has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with N (N-1)/2 degrees of freedom. 
Pesaran (2004) indicates that the LM test is only valid when N is relatively small and T is 
sufficiently large. This drawback is tried to be solved by Pesaran (2004) by the following scaled 
version of the LM test (the so-called CD test): 
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However, Pesaran et al. (2008) state that while the population average pair-wise correlations are 
zero, the CD test will have less power. Therefore, they propose a bias-adjusted test that is a 
modified version of the LM test by using the exact mean and variance of the LM statistic. The 
bias-adjusted LM statistic is calculated as follows: 
 
CDadj = √
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where uTij and vTij
2  are the exact mean and variance of (T-k) ρ̂ij
2 , which are provided by 
Pesaran et al. (2008). Under the null hypothesis with first T → ∞ and then N → ∞, CDadj test 
is asymptotically distributed as standard normal.  
 
Slope homogeneity tests 
 
When analysing panel data, another issue to consider is the heterogeneity of the estimated 
coefficients for each individual case in the panel. As indicated by Granger (2003), the strong 
null hypothesis is that the causality from one variable to another is obtained by imposing the 
joint restriction of slope homogeneity for the whole panel. In addition, Breitung (2005) also 
points out that the assumption of homogeneity for the parameters is not able to capture the 
heterogeneity that may arise due to country specific characteristics. 
 
The standard F-test is the most widely used way to test the null hypothesis of slope 
homogeneity H0 : βi = β for all i against the hypothesis of heterogeneity H1 : βi ≠ βj for a non-
zero fraction of pair-wise slopes for i≠j. This requires that the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous and the error variances are homoscedastic. To relax the assumption of 
homoscedasticity in the F-test, Swamy (1970) developed a slope homogeneity test that examines 
the dispersion of individual slope estimates from a suitable pooled estimator.  
 
Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) state that both the F-test and Swamy’s test require panel data 
models where N is relatively small compared to T. Therefore, they propose a standardized 
version of Swamy’s test (hereafter, ∆̃ test) for testing slope homogeneity in large panels. The 
∆̃ test is valid when (N, T) → ∞ without any restrictions on the relative expansion rates of N and 
T when the error terms are normally distributed. Swamy’s statistic can then be modified as: 
 
?̃?= 
1
N
i
 (?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑊𝐹𝐸)
′
 
𝑋𝑖
′𝑀𝜏𝑋𝑖
?̂?𝑖
2 (?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑊𝐹𝐸)              ,                                     (5) 
 
where β̂i is the pooled OLS estimator; β̂WFE is the weighted fixed effect pooled estimator of the 
Equation (1); Mτ is an identity matrix of order T and σ̂i
2 is the estimator of σi
2. Pesaran and 
Yamagata (2008) further develop the following standardized dispersion statistic:  
 
∆̃ = √𝑁 (
𝑁−1?̃?−𝑘
√2𝑘
)                                                                            (6) 
 
Under the null hypothesis with the condition of (N, T)  ∞ and so long as √N/T → ∞, and 
when the error terms are normally distributed, the ∆̃ test has an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution. The small sample properties of the ∆̃ test can be improved when there are normally 
distributed errors by using the following mean and variance bias adjusted version: 
 
∆̃𝑎𝑑𝑗 = √𝑁 (
𝑁−1?̃?−𝐸(?̃?𝑖𝑡)
√𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑖𝑡)
)               ,                                                           (7) 
 
where the mean E(Z̃it) = k, and  var(Z̃it) = 2k(T-k-1)/(T+1). 
Appendix C  
 
Results for panel causality analyses. 
 
Table 1 Results for panel causality (FC indicator: FC(AA)) 
 
PIIGGS 
Country 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = FC(AA) does not cause EG 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = EG does not cause FC(AA) 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Portugal -0.16273 0.82343 5.28335 5.28335   1.75745 0.02548 1.10740 3.96173 3.96173   2.53041 
Ireland -0.41502 0.11022 4.77446   4.77446   2.67026 -0.03192 5.21495 4.17111   4.17111   3.03209 
Italy 0.69450 1.76761 5.83104 5.83104 5.67016 -0.00651 0.57135 9.15048 9.15048 1.03839   
Greece -0.55040 0.40488 4.36091 4.36091 2.39071 -0.03028 2.06961 1.05632 1.05632 0.98980 
Great Britain 0.50950 0.94671 5.55818   5.55818 3.15018 -0.00541 0.29052 2.90616 2.90616 1.78348 
Spain 0.15449 0.10612 3.04973 3.04973 2.69261 -0.05733 7.10445 5.13075 5.13075 3.11739 
Notes: FC(AA), EG, FC(IMF) and EMP denote Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal consolidation episode, economic growth, IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode and employment, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Results for panel causality (FC indicator: FC(IMF)) 
PIIGGS 
Country 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = FC(IMF) does not cause EG 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = EG does not cause FC(IMF) 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Portugal -1.07084 2.99383 7.49234 7.49234 4.67971 -0.01088 0.25445 1.67160 1.67160 1.29877 
Ireland -1.91644 2.64974 8.86966 8.86966 4.77884 -0.01902 1.71556 6.42064 6.42064 5.65493 
Italy -0.48262 1.60715 4.63235 4.63235 3.13276 -0.00788 0.84041 5.07904 5.07904 1.98424 
Great Britain -0.02408 0.22356 4.15428 4.15428 3.55672 0.00635 0.59002 10.80464 10.80464 2.91363 
Spain -0.19597 0.16044 2.05166 2.05166 1.28434 -0.02694 1.56751 7.96429 7.96429 2.23438 
Notes: FC(AA), EG, FC(IMF) and EMP denote Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal consolidation episode, economic growth, IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode, and employment, respectively. The IMF’s dummy 
is not available for Greece and the IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode cover time sample (1980-2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Results for panel causality (FC indicator: FC(AA)) 
PIIGGS 
Country 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = FC(AA) does not cause EMP 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = EMP does not cause FC(AA) 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Portugal -1.12831 3.76456 1.95884 1.95884 1.07471 -0.09480 15.69032 4.26783 4.26783 2.79196 
Ireland 2.63035 0.37999 1.08611 1.08611 0.66134 -0.00035 0.88096 1.04179 1.04179 0.90866 
Italy 0.90295 3.06498 4.42442 4.42442 4.23890 -0.02411 4.88737 10.26707 10.26707 8.68227 
Greece -1.51464 3.61393 4.91311 4.91311 3.75933 0.00972 1.16769 12.57556 12.57556 9.68436 
Great Britain -0.84713 0.39491 3.81916 3.81916 2.07450 -0.00077 0.41475 17.57018 17.57018 13.63125 
Spain 0.28463 0.19138 3.14445 3.14445 2.09511 -0.00611 0.13339 3.03614 3.03614 2.25274 
Notes: FC(AA), EG and EMP denote Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) fiscal consolidation episode, economic growth, and employment, respectively.  
 
 
Table 4 Results for panel causality (FC indicator: FC(IMF)) 
 
PIIGGS 
Country 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = FC(IMF) does not cause EMP 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Wald 
stat 
𝐻0 = EMP does not cause FC(IMF) 
Bootstrap Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Portugal 0.04087 0.42470 11.68814 11.68814 6.72849 0.05988 8.50611 4.22395 4.22395 3.06663 
Ireland -7.24086 3.66861 5.23620 5.23620 4.15145 -0.00178 0.17453 16.30186 16.30186 3.71379 
Italy -0.95654 4.87490 11.60518 11.60518 3.59538 0.00930 0.68372 1.15398 1.15398 1.09920 
Great Britain 2.23364 2.18145 3.49732 3.49732 2.35241 -0.00460 2.39545 11.89618 11.89618 2.84655 
Spain -0.61144 0.82520 3.96793 3.96793 2.13894 -0.02782 3.25413 10.55532 10.55532 3.17384 
Notes: EG, FC(IMF) and EMP denote economic growth, IMF’s fiscal consolidation episode and employment, respectively. The IMF’s dummy is not available for Greece and the IMF’s fiscal consolidation 
episode cover time sample (1980-2007).  
 
 
